Introduction
The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as "the Act") has not only changed the kind of sentences that may be imposed on a child offender and the principles in terms of which the appropriate sentence should be established, 1 but has also amended or clarified several procedural issues closely associated with sentencing.
In this contribution a number of these procedural issues are considered in some detail. These procedures are related to pre-sentence reports, to victim impact statements and also to the review of and appeals against decisions by child justice courts. In each instance the aim is to establish as precisely as possible whether the Act has changed the status quo, whether it does so effectively and, if it has, the extent to which it now requires a different approach.
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1
For a discussion of the international and constitutional background to the Act, with a specific focus on sentencing, see Terblanche 2012 PELJ . Some foundational issues that are addressed in some detail in that contribution include the role of s 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the theory of the best interests of the child as a paramount consideration, and some of the challenges that need to be overcome in interpreting the Act.
been appointed as a probation officer under section 2 of the Probation Services Act" 116 of 1991. 10 In terms of this provision a probation officer is appointed by the Minister of Social Development. 11 A person may be appointed as a probation officer
There is no sanction for late submission of the report, but a court might be able to fall back on the general principles that apply when a functionary fails to comply with a court order. In S v Z 2004 1 SACR 400 (EC) paras 12, 13 the court ordered two departments in the Eastern Cape government to report on the transfer of young offenders who had been committed to reform schools, but not yet transferred. Subsequently, the Eastern Cape High Court ordered many of these children to be released from custody. This order was based on the powers in s 173 of the Constitution, which permit the higher courts to "protect and regulate their own process … in the interests of justice", and the common law powers of review (paras 27-28; see also s 24 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959). Although magistrates' courts do not have these powers, they could send a case on review to the high court in terms of s 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereafter the Criminal Procedure Act).
8
See also the NDPP Directives para Q.4. 9 Section 1.
10
See Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 338 fn 9. See also Minister of Police National Instruction 2 of 2010, where "probation officer" is defined in the same terms as in the Act.
11
See Ehlers Child Justice 29. The Act refers to "the Minister" (s 2(1)). The relevant Minister is assigned by the President under s 17(1) of the Probation Services Act 116 of 1991. The last such assignment which could be found was in Proc No R80, 1994 where the functions of the "Minister for National Health and Welfare" were assigned to the "Administrators of the various provinces with effect from 29 April 1994." However, it is submitted that s 33(3) of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 is sufficiently wide so that it can be assumed that all functions associated with social development (including all welfare services) have been transferred to the Minister of Social Development.
… he or she is a social worker in the employ of the State, a welfare organisation or a non-profit organisation and is registered as a social worker with the South African Council for Social Service Professions.
12
Therefore, registration as a social worker at the Council, and employment at one of the above-mentioned institutions, is essential for appointment as a probation officer.
A probation officer who has been appointed as such by the Minister becomes an officer of every magistrate's court. 13 The phrase "an officer of the court" does not have a specific definition in terms of our law 14 and it is not frequently used, except to describe the role of prosecutors, attorneys and advocates. 15 The phrase generally indicates that the "officer" is expected to serve the court and not the interests of one of the parties, 16 and that the court can regulate the manner in which such "officers"
perform their duties and functions. 17 In the case of probation officers it is submitted that, as they are described as officers of the court, they are expected to be independent in expressing their opinions, but that they should also subject themselves to the regulation of the court. there are no obvious reasons why they should now be excluded from doing so.
However, in view of the peremptory wording 20 it is submitted that it would generally be advisable for the child justice court to comply with section 71(1) and to request a pre-sentence report from a probation officer. Such an approach would not prevent these other experts from also providing the court with a report on sentencing. Of course, such reports could also be obtained when the specific case falls within one of the exceptions permitted by section 71.
It only remains to note here that in terms of the Probation Services Act the "powers and duties" of probation officers specifically include … the investigation of the circumstances of a convicted person, the compiling of a pre-sentencing report, the recommendation of an appropriate sentence and the giving of evidence before the court. The exceptions to the general principle that pre-sentence reports must always be obtained are to be found in section 71(1)(b) of the Act, which reads as follows:
A child justice court may dispense with a pre-sentence report where a child 22 is convicted of an offence referred to in Schedule 1 or where requiring the report would cause undue delay in the conclusion of the case, to the prejudice of the child, but no child justice court sentencing a child may impose a sentence involving 19 With respect to the role of such experts on sentencing, see Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 21-22, 104. 20 See Gxubane 2008 SA Crime Quarterly 13, noting that an earlier version of the Child Justice Bill did make provision for other people to provide pre-sentence reports.
21
Section 4(1)(k) of the Probation Services Act 116 of 1991.
22
Reference to "child" in this section should, of course, be interpreted in terms of the definition of "child" in s 1. This definition results in a fairly complicated situation, but as a general rule it includes all children when the criminal proceedings were instituted while they were under the age of 18 years old, but also a limited number of child offenders where the cases were instituted later but in accordance with the relevant NDPP directive. Pre-sentence reports might therefore have to be obtained for offenders who are 18 years old or older when the report is actually compiled. compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre … or imprisonment, unless a pre-sentence report has first been obtained. 31 Both these sentences will certainly require a pre-sentence report.
Imprisonment may also be imposed as an alternative to a fine, and in this case the position is not clear. The Criminal Procedure Act permits ordinary criminal courts to impose a fine and to add alternative imprisonment at the same time. 32 However, the Child Justice Act is silent in this regard. The only connection with imprisonment in the Act, as far as fines are concerned, is that it requires of a child justice court, before it imposes a fine, to consider whether or not the failure to pay a fine is likely to result in the child offender being imprisoned. 33 It also requires the court to warn the offender that failure to pay the fine "will result in the child being brought back
28
A court using this option will have to take into account several complicating factors, including that the offence will be fairly serious (sch 2 or 3 offences only); and that reintegration of the child offender into society remains a major objective of the child justice system. The practical effect of section 71 is that a pre-sentence report is compulsory in virtually every case. 38 Even though a community-based sentence does not require a pre-sentence report in the case of schedule-1 offences, it will be difficult for the presiding officer to find an appropriate combination of conditions and someone to monitor compliance without the assistance of a probation officer. The same situation applies, roughly, in the case of correctional supervision. 39 As far as other sentences 34 Section 74(3)(b).
35
Section 74(1)(b).
36
See the Preamble to the Act, as well as s 3(i), read with s 28 of the Constitution.
37
As part of the guiding principles in s 3 of the Act, such as subs 3(a) (consequences should be proportionate); subs 3(b) (children are not to be treated more severely than adults). Criminal Procedure Act), this is not exactly the same kind of report as envisaged by the Child are concerned, it is only when a court imposes a fine that is within the immediate means of the child offender to pay that the report could be dispensed with, and then usually only in the case of a schedule-1 offence. These instances are further limited by the ideal that the vast majority of schedule-1 offences should be diverted.
40
It is worth noting here that a pre-sentence report should not require much effort from the probation officer, as a child offender reaching the sentencing stage would already have been assessed by a probation officer earlier on in the child justice process.
41

Deviating from the recommendation in the pre-sentence report
Section 71(4) of the Act reads as follows:
42
A child justice court may impose a sentence other than that recommended in the pre-sentence report and must, in that event, enter the reasons for the imposition of a different sentence on the record of the proceedings.
In effect this provision simply confirms the status quo. It should stand to reason that a court is not bound by the recommendation in a pre-sentence report. Imposing a sentence is a judicial function, 43 which cannot be "abdicated" to another authority.
44
It is a further general requirement that a court must give reasons for its decisions, including the sentencing decision. 45 In other words, even if the recommendation of the pre-sentence report is followed, in terms of the current legal position the presiding officer is expected to give reasons for the court's sentence. It is common sense then that there would be an even greater duty on the court to explain the sentence when it differs from what has been suggested in the pre-sentence report.
46 3
Victim impact statements
In terms of section 70(2) of the Act the prosecutor may provide the child justice court with a victim impact statement, 47 in consideration of "the interests of a victim of the offence and the impact of the crime on the victim".
A victim impact statement is defined in section 70(1), which reads as follows:
For purposes of this section, a victim impact statement means a sworn statement by the victim or someone authorised by the victim to make a statement on behalf of the victim which reflects the physical, psychological, social, financial or any other consequences of the offence for the victim.
The definition consists of three main elements: What should the position be if the prosecutor elects not to present a victim impact statement? In other words, would the child justice court be entitled to act unilaterally to obtain a victim impact statement? On the face of it section 70 appears to entrust only the prosecution with this entitlement. In some respects, the position could be said to be analogous to the prosecutor's discretion to prove previous convictions against the offender. This discretion is provided for in section 271(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, of which the relevant part reads as follows: "The prosecution may … produce to the court for admission or denial by the accused a record of previous convictions alleged against the accused."
Several cases have stressed that the discretion to prove previous convictions belongs to the prosecutor. 61 In most of these cases the conclusion was reached that it is irregular for the court to interfere with this discretion and to determine by itself if the offender has previous convictions. The wording in section 70(2) of the Act is virtually identical, and reads as follows: "The prosecutor may … where practicable, furnish the child justice court with a victim impact statement … ."
It is submitted that there is no meaningful difference between these provisions. The presence or absence of previous convictions is one of the most important determinants of an appropriate sentence. 62 The same cannot be said of the information in a victim impact statement. Therefore, based on the analogy of section 271(1), a child justice court will need very convincing reasons before any mero motu action to obtain a victim impact statement could be justified.
Appeal and review
Appeal against sentence
The same procedures regarding appeals against conviction and sentence that apply in the case of adult offenders generally also apply in the case of offenders tried and sentenced in terms of the Act. The Act makes it somewhat easier for some child offenders to appeal, as not all children need to apply for leave to appeal when such leave is required by the Criminal Procedure Act. 63 In terms of section 84(1) of the Act, these children who need not apply for leave to appeal area) children who were under 16 years old when they committed the offence, regardless of the sentence; or b) children who were 16 years or older when they committed the offence, who were sentenced to "any form of imprisonment that was not wholly suspended. This simply means that the automatic review of proceedings, which is provided for in section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act, is suspended when an appeal is duly noted by the child offender. 66 The relevant provisions are discussed below. 
Automatic review in certain cases
The provisions of section 85
In terms of section 85 (1) 16 years or older but under the age of 18 years, and has been sentenced to any form of imprisonment that was not wholly suspended, or any sentence of compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre providing a programme provided for in section 191(2)(j) of the Children's Act, the sentence is subject to review in terms of section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act by a judge of the High Court having jurisdiction, irrespective of the duration of the sentence. The use of the phrase "alleged offence" probably derives from legislative over-cautiousness, as by this stage a child justice court would inevitably have determined that the offender had actually committed "the alleged offence". the Criminal Procedure Act. It is important to read the quoted part of section 85 (1) as a single idea. The only kind of review of criminal proceedings dealt with by chapter 30 is that of proceedings in magistrates' courts that are ordinarily (or automatically) reviewable. Proceedings in regional courts are not reviewable, as section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act is explicitly limited to magistrates' courts. 70 However, this does not mean that criminal proceedings in a regional court are not reviewable when it functions as a child justice court.
All children convicted in terms of the Act
The words "in respect of all children convicted in terms of this Act" means that there are no exceptions, except for the following two: (a) in the case of children of 16 and 17 only custodial sentences are reviewable, 71 and (b) no case is reviewable when the offender notes an appeal against the decision of the child justice court. 72 Apart from these exceptions, the cases of all children convicted in and then sentenced by a child justice court have to be submitted for automatic review. 73 As this affects "all children", there is no reason why child justice proceedings in a regional court should be excluded from such review.
74
It also does not matter whether or not the child has been legally represented during the proceedings in the child justice court. 75 There have been conflicting judgments in this respect, which are discussed below. The italicisation is intended to indicate that it is actually the sentencing that will cause the proceedings to be reviewable, despite the apparent focus of s 85(1) on the conviction. The conviction is an essential step on the way to the sentence, but ch 30 of the Criminal Procedure Act applies only after a sentence has been imposed.
See Joubert Criminal Procedure Handbook 365; also S v CS 2012 1 SACR 595 (ECP) para 26.
75
In the case of adult offenders, the proceedings would not be reviewable when the offenders have been assisted by a legal representative (s 302(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act).
76
Most judgments held that legal representation does not affect reviewability: see S v Ruiter [2011 ] ZAWCHC 265 (14 Jun 2011 265 para 3 (because the high court "is the upper guardian of all minors within its jurisdictional area"); S v Fortuin [2011 ] ZANCHC 28 (11 Nov 2011 28 paras 49-52; S v CS 2012 1 SACR 595 (ECP) para 31; S v Khuzwayo [2012] ZAGPJHC 113 (31 May should make no difference, apart from the wording of the Act, is that the assistance of a legal advisor is not a guarantee that the child offender will suffer no prejudice. [2011] ZANCHC 28 (11 Nov 2011) 28 para 7 notes that such a distinction is in accordance with statements in the Preamble that children "in conflict with the law" should be afforded "special protection", at the same time taking account of the child's age. Contra S v Sekoere [2012] ZAFSHC 114 (14 Jun 2012) para 10.1 (only sentences of imprisonment and residence in a care centre are involved, a view not further elucidated). There is room for an argument that it could not have been the intention of the legislature that a sentence such as a small fine which is paid immediately should be subject to automatic review, since the phrase "irrespective of the duration of the sentence" could not be applied to sentences that would not literally involve any element of duration. However, our courts have not yet considered this argument.
Para (b).
81
See 4.1 above.
Compulsory residence in a care centre
The words "or any sentence of compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre providing a programme provided for in section 191(2)(j) of the Children's Act" simply refer to the sentence of residence in a child and youth care centre provided for in section 76 of the Act. The words "subject to review in terms of section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act" simply refer to the ordinary procedure that has to be followed during an automatic review. The phrase "irrespective of the duration of the sentence" has been included into section 85, as the provisions of section 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act are directly related to the duration of the sentences imposed on adult offenders. As a result the duration of the sentence has no effect on the automatic reviewability of any matter dealt with by a child justice court. 84 Another consequence of this phrase is that the experience of the presiding officer is no longer of any relevance, 85 except perhaps when it comes to the imposition of fines. In this respect it has been held that, in order for child offenders aged 16 or 17 at the time of the offence not to be afforded less protection than adult offenders, the amounts of the fines referred to in section 302(1) must also be applied to such child offenders.
The Act includes the phrase "providing a programme provided for in s 191(2)(j) of the Children's Act" whenever mention is made of this sentence, and it has no special meaning. See S v Fortuin [2011 ] ZANCHC 28 (11 Nov 2011 Another problem with the judgment in Nakedi is that, although it apparently takes note of the paramountcy of the child's best interests, 97 it gives no inkling as to how its conclusion would benefit child offenders. Further, it does not explain why a conclusion that automatic review is compulsory also in cases where there was legal representation is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The court in S v Sekoere 98 attended to this problem and eventually decided that, if the legislature wanted to exclude "minors" from the working of section 302, it would have done so explicitly.
99
It is submitted that the judgments finding in favour of the automatic review of most cases involving child offenders, as discussed above, have interpreted the Act correctly. Not only have they interpreted the Act as a whole, 100 instead of only focusing on section 99 thereof, but they have also indicated convincingly how their conclusion is in accordance with statements in the Preamble to the Act that children "in conflict with the law" should be afforded "special protection", at the same time 94 SeeTerblanche Guide to Sentencing 322-333. 95 See S v CS 2012 1 SACR 595 (ECP) para 20.
96
The Act specifically provides for the incorporation of some of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, but also for the predominance of its own provisions, in s 4(3)(a) (The "Criminal Procedure Act applies with the necessary changes" to child justice proceedings, "except in so far as this Act provides for amended, additional or different provisions or procedures …" and s 63(1)(b). taking account of the child's age. 101 It is also inescapable that sections 82 and 83 of the Act will have the effect that "a child appearing before a child justice court will in effect never be without legal representation", 102 a situation which would render the whole of section 85(1) meaningless if the cases of children who are legally represented are not automatically reviewable.
Closing comments
It was explained in the introduction that it was the aim of this contribution to consider the provisions of the Child Justice Act in connection with pre-sentence reports and victim impact statements, as well as the review of, and appeals against, sentence decisions by child justice courts. The intention with each of these topics was to establish whether the Act has changed the law effectively and whether it now requires a different approach.
With respect to pre-sentence reports, the conclusion is that the Act requires a presentence report by a probation officer in every case, before sentence may be imposed in terms of the Act. Under the former position, judicial officers fairly regularly sentenced child offenders without the advantage of such a report, a situation that will clearly now be unacceptable. This conclusion does not mean that every report will be to the satisfaction of the sentencer, or that there will not be any delays in the finalisation of pre-sentence reports.
The Act has certainly changed, quite substantially, the law in connection with the submission of victim impact statements. The court does not appear to have any discretion over whether or not to receive such a statement when the prosecutor wishes to present it. Whether this change will provide any real relief to victims of crime or not remains to be seen.
101
See S v Fortuin [2011 ] ZANCHC 28 (11 Nov 2011 The Act makes it somewhat easier for child offenders to appeal against the decisions of child justice courts, and its provisions in connection with the review "in the ordinary course" has created quite a stir in the high courts, with conflicting findings in several provincial divisions. Although I support the view that all cases should be reviewable in the case of child offenders under 16 years of age, and that it should make no difference to the question of reviewability whether or not the offender was legally represented or not, a final judgment in this respect from the Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court would no doubt be welcome.
As long as judicial officers consider the Act as a whole when they interpret individual provisions, the Act should consistently improve the protection afforded to child offenders in our child justice system. 
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